

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 080771
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WBSMITHII:SKG:LLC:DEF:SEB
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA:ALATHERTONJR
S/S - MR. SEBASTIAN

-----112144Z 027660 /62

O R 112113Z APR 77 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T STATE 080771

NODIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS, LE, UR, XJ, EG

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MOSCOW VISIT; SADAT-U.S. VISIT:
BRIEFING OF ISRAELIS

1. SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY APRIL 8 IN BRIEFING DINITZ ON
HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW AND SADAT VISIT COMMENDED ISRAELI
RESTRAINT TOWARD SERIOUS SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND
SAID IT WAS CRITICAL THAT SITUATION BE KEPT FROM EXPLODING.
DINITZ SAID ISRAEL HAD NO EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN MOVEMENT
SOUTH. ON SADAT VISIT, DINITZ REACTED SKEPTICALLY TO THE
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 080771

SECRETARY'S POINT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SOFT IN EGYPTIAN
VIEW-OF ISSUE OF NATURE OF PEACE BUT ACCEPTED THAT SOME
EGYPTIAN FLEXIBILITY COULD DEVELOP. THE SECRETARY SAID
SADAT HAD BEEN ADAMANT ON BORDERS AND STUCK TO HIS POSITION
ON PLO REPRESENTATION WHILE FAVORING JORDAN LINK WITH WEST
BANK ENTITY. SADAT HAD ACCEPTED U.S. POINT THAT ARABS HAD
TO GET THEIR HOUSE IN ORDER ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION
ISSUE. U.S. HAD AGREED TO STUDY EGYPTIAN ARMS DESIRES BUT
MADE NO COMMITMENTS OR DECISIONS. IN MOSCOW THE SECRETARY
HAD INQUIRED AND FOUND NO DIMUNITION IN SOVIET SUPPORT FOR

PLO. OTHER SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POSITIONS ALSO HAD NOT CHANGED. SOVIETS HAD BEEN UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN THE SECRETARY PRESSED QUESTION ABOUT SOVIET REFUSAL TO REESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED FROM THE

SECRETARY ISRAELI LISTS OF JEWISH PRISONERS BUT SAID THEY COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCES. END SUMMARY.

2. DINITZ WITH BAR-ON CALLED ON THE SECRETARY WITH ATHERTON PRESENT APRIL 8 FOR BRIEFING ON MOSCOW AND SADAT VISITS. DINITZ REVIEWED ISRAELI INTERNAL SITUATION IN WAKE OF RABIN RESIGNATION, EXPRESSING SADNESS OVER SUCH ENDING OF RABIN'S CAREER. THE SECRETARY VOICED SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL IN THIS TROUBLE.

3. SOUTHERN LEBANON

4. THE SECRETARY SAID RESTRAINT ISRAEL HAD EXERCISED WAS COMMENDABLE. IT WAS CRITICAL TO PREVENT SITUATION FROM EXPLODING AND DRAWING EVERYONE IN. U.S. WAS IN TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES TO POINT OUT DANGERS OF SITUATION GETTING OUT OF HAND. DINITZ EXPLAINED ISRAELI DOMESTIC CRISIS HAD PREVENTED DELIVERY BY ISRAEL OF REPLY PROMISED TO U.S. BY APRIL 8. ISRAEL SAW NO SYRIAN MOVEMENT TO SOUTH BUT PERMISSIVENESS ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENTS, SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND SAIQA INVOLVEMENT. ANSWERING THE SECRETARY
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 080771

ABOUT LOGISTICS, DINITZ SAID SYRIAN AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSIT WAS NEW. ISRAEL ALSO BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN SOME SYRIAN ARTILLERY SUPPORT. DINITZ STRESSED THAT ISRAEL AT EARLY POINT URGED CHRISTIANS NOT TO EXTEND THEIR HOLD BEYOND ORIGINAL POSITIONS. REPORTS THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING CHRISTIANS WERE FALSE. ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THREE POSSIBILITIES: SYRIAN MOVEMENT TOWARD BORDER; SITUATING OF FEDAYEEN IN SUCH MANNER AS TO THREATEN ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; AND OCCUPATION OF FRONTIER AREAS BY SOME INTER-ARAB FORCE.

5. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAEL'S GOOD FENCE ARRANGEMENTS WERE CONTINUING. DINITZ SAID SOME WOUNDED HAD CROSSED INTO ISRAEL APRIL 7, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN ONE INSTANCE OF SHELLING ACROSS BORDER OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. ISRAEL HAD TAKEN STEPS TO CALM REPORTS INSIDE ISRAEL OF ALLEGED SYRIAN MOVEMENTS.

6. THE SECRETARY AND ATHERTON INFORMED DINITZ AMBASSADOR PARKER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ASK BOUTROS IF LEBANESE COULD INDUCE CHRISTIANS TO DISCUSS IDEA OF STANDSTILL, AND BOUTROS HAD AGREED TO RAISE QUESTION WITH SARKIS. .S. HAD ALSO MADE APPROACH APRIL 7 IN DAMASCUS
THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN ANY SYRIAN

REACTION. DINITZ COMMENTED SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS OCCUPYING

ISRAELI PUBLIC MIND. HE WANTED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH
AND WOULD CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT ANY REPORTS HE MIGHT RECEIVE
OVER WEEKEND.

7. SECRETARY'S TRIP TO MOSCOW

8. THE SECRETARY SAID SOVIETS HAD STATED THEIR OBJECTIVE
AND RESPONSIBILITY WERE TO TRY TO ASSIST IN FINDING JUST
AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE. VIEWS THEY OUTLINED ON
ISSUES WERE STANDARD. QUESTION AROSE OF POSSIBLE CHANGE
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 080771

IN SOVIET POSITION ON PLO BECAUSE OF PRESS COVERAGE OF
GROMYKO REMARK AT LUNCH. THE SECRETARY ASKED GROMYKO
SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THIS AND DETERMINED THAT SOVIETS HAD
NOT BECOME LESS SUPPORTIVE OF PLO. SOVIET POSITION ON
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WAS THE SAME AS IN BREZHNEV'S SPEECH.
THE SECRETARY HAD SAID HE FELT THIS WAS ONE-SIDED ANALYSIS
OF SITUATION AND GAVE SOVIETS OTHER SIDE.

9. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED SOVIETS AND HE HAD DISCUSSED
NEED FOR COOPERATION ON MIDDLE EAST. HE HAD STATED THAT
U.S. FELT SOVIETS HAD RESPONSIBILITY AS GENEVA CO-CHAIR-
MAN TO DO UTMOST TO SEE TO IT SOLUTION WAS REACHED AND
THERE SHOULD BE COOPERATION. THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED
TO INCLUSION OF SENTENCE IN COMMUNIQUE TO EFFECT THAT
U.S. AND USSR AS CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD COOPERATE.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID GROMYKO HAD NOTED USSR HAD
SUPPORTED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL FROM OUTSET, WHICH LED
SECRETARY TO ASK HIM WHY USSR DID NOT RENEW RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL. GROMYKO REPLIED SOVIET PEOPLE WOULD NOT UNDER-
STAND SUCH MOVE BECAUSE TIME WAS NOT RIPE. SECRETARY
HAD PERSISTED, SAYING IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOVIETS WOULD
COMMUNICATE WITH ISRAEL AND START ALTERING RELATIONSHIP.
SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY WERE UNCOMFORTABLE. DINITZ OPINED PART
OF SOVIET CONCERN WAS ABOUT REOPENING OF ISRAELI EMBASSY
IN MOSCOW, IN LIGHT OF USSR'S JEWISH QUESTION.

11. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT IN RECEIVING FROM HIM
ISRAELI LISTS OF JEWISH PRISONERS AND PERSECUTEES, SOVIETS
SAID THEY WOULD STUDY THIS MATERIAL BUT COULD OFFER NO
COMMITMENT ABOUT RESULT. U.S. IN ANY EVENT HAD RAISED
ISSUE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN, AND SOVIETS HAD NOT REJECTED

MATERIAL. DINITZ VOICED WARM APPRECIATION AND THOUGHT
FACT OF U.S. EXPRESSION OF CONCERN MIGHT RESTRAIN SOVIETS.
TURNING TO DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS, THE SECRETARY EX-
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 080771

PRESSED GRATIFICATION ON EXTENT OF PROGRESS ON ISSUES OTHER THAN SALT. U.S. AND SOVIETS WOULD SET UP WORKING GROUPS, AND U.S. INTENDED TO RESUME AT GENEVA. TALKS HAD NOT COLLAPSED OR BEEN BROKEN OFF AND U.S. INTENDED TO BE PATIENT AND TO PERSEVERE.

12. SADAT VISIT

13. THE SECRETARY SAID ALL ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN EGYPTIAN SHIFT, AS HAD BEEN NOTED IN PRESS, ON NATURE OF PEACE. SADAT HAD NOW MOVED SOME DISTANCE FROM IDEA THAT PEACE WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT TO NEXT GENERATION. U.S. SIDE HAD STRESSED HARD WITH SADAT IMPORTANCE AND FAIRNESS OF VIEWPOINT THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE NORMALIZATION.

14. DINITZ SAID ISRAELIS HAD FOLLOWED SADAT PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS CLOSELY. WITHOUT WANTING TO BE POLEMICAL, DINITZ SAID SADAT'S USE OF TERM "NORMALIZATION" WAS NOT NEW, AS HE HAD USED IT WITH GENSCHER. FURTHERMORE, WHEN ASKED LATER IN U.S. INTERVIEW, HE SAID NORMALIZATION DID NOT MEAN TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS, ONLY TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY. SADAT ADDED TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS MIGHT DEVELOP LATER BUT WERE NOT PART OF HIS CONCEPT OF PEACE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SUGGESTED SADAT ACCEPTED ISRAELI POSITION BUT ONLY THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT. AHERTON OPINED SADAT WAS BEGINNING FOR FIRST TIME TO FOCUS ON ISSUE OF NATURE OF PEACE. DINITZ SUGGESTED SADAT MIGHT HAVE NOW REALIZED HIS DEFINITION OF PEACE AS MERELY TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY WAS NOT GOAL EVERYONE SHOULD STRIVE FOR AND THEREFORE WAS REFLECTING ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.

15. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED SADAT HAD BEEN ADAMANT ON BOUNDARY ISSUE. HE ALSO HAD STRESSED PALESTINIAN ENTITY
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 080771

WITH CONFEDERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN, WHICH SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BEFORE GENEVA CONFERENCE. DINITZ SAID HE GATHERED SADAT HAD REJECTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S BOUNDARY CONCEPT AND DID NOT ACCEPT THAT DISTINCTION WAS POSSIBLE BETWEEN SOVEREIGN BORDERS AND SECURITY LINES. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED THIS, NOTING SADAT DID NOT RULE OUT DEMILITARIZED ZONES. WHEN DINITZ ASKED IF SADAT DID NOT INSIST THAT SUCH ZONES BE ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER, THE SECRETARY REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. THE SECRETARY ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SADAT HAD CALLED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES WITH ONLY MINOR RECTIFICATIONS, BASICALLY ON WEST BANK. DINITZ CHARACTERIZED THIS AS TRADITIONAL

EGYPTIAN POSITION.

16. DINITZ OBSERVED ON PALESTINAIN QUESTION SADAT HAD USED TERM ENTITY BUT HAD ALSO USED WORD "STATE" SEVERAL TIMES TOO. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT SADAT HAD MEANT STATE AND AGREED WITH DINITZ SADAT ENVISAGED STATE COMPRISING

WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP WITH LINKING CORRIDOR. DINITZ SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND SADAT'S REITERATION OF THESE POSITIONS. ISRAELIS SAW NO DEVIATION FOR BETTER OR WORSE, ALTHOUGH SOME ISRAELIS SENSED EGYPT DEEMPHASIS ON LINK BETWEEN PALESTINIAN ENTITY AND JORDAN. THE SECRETARY NOTED SADAT HAD ASSERTED PLO HAD MODERATED ITS STAND AND THAT THERE WAS NO ONE ELSE AT THIS POINT TO REPRESENT PALESTINIANS. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH DINITZ PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY GREAT CHANGE. SINGLE CHANGE WAS READINESS OF PALESTINIANS NOW TO BE PART OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH SADAT DESCRIBED AS SHOWING PALESTINIAN TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL, FORMAL ACCEPTANCE BEING PLO BARGAINING CARD WHICH SADAT SAID PLO COULD NOT GIVE UP NOW.

17. DINITZ ASSESSED SADAT'S STATEMENTS IN WASHINGTON TALKS AS COINCIDING WITH PUBLIC EGYPTIAN POSITION. THE SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 080771

SECRETARY SENSED FROM SADAT VISIT NEW OPENNESS ON CONDITIONS OF PEACE. DINITZ ASKED IF THIS MEANT SOMETHING MIGHT NOW MOVE. THE SECRETARY SAID YES, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR. THERE APPEARED TO BE GENUINE DIFFERENCE, IN THAT EGYPTIANS PREVIOUSLY WOULD NOT EVEN DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. DINITZ COMPLAINED SADAT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN WASHINGTON HAD INSINUATED THAT RECENT REMARKS OF PRESIDENT CARTER WERE CLOSER TO ARAB POSITION, NOTABLY ON ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN STATE, THAN WAS THE CASE. THIS MIGHT LEAVE IMPRESSION ON PUBLIC MIND AND WAS CLEVER MOVE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS STOOD ON THEIR OWN TWO FEET, AND U.S. VIEWS HAD NOT CHANGED.

18. DINITZ ASKED THE SECRETARY HOW HE ASSESSED CURRENT ARAB ATTITUDES. THE SECRETARY REPLIED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF NATURE OF PEACE IN DIFFERENT WAY WAS POSITIVE STEP. HE SAW NO MOVEMENT ON PLO, WHICH REMAINED THORNY PROBLEM. ATTITUDE ON 1967 BORDERS WAS AS EXPECTED. AHERTON ADDED SADAT RECOGNIZED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION WAS MAJOR OBSTACLE TO GENEVA AND WAS FOR ARABS TO RESOLVE. ALSO, EGYPT AGREED WITH ISRAEL THAT ONLY SEPARATE DELEGATIONS SHOULD GO TO GENEVA.

19. TURNING TO US-EGYPTIAN BILATERAL MATTERS THE SECRETARY SAID US WOULD TAKE SERIOUS LOOK AT IDEA OF SURVEYING GULF. U.S. ECONOMIC AID WOULD STAND WHERE IT WAS. THERE HAD

BEEN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SADAT
RAISED EGYPTIAN NEEDS IN NUMBER OF AREAS. NO DECISIONS
WERE MADE. DINITZ ASKED IF SADAT BASED HIS REQUEST ON

THREAT IN AFRICA, AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS AS
WELL AS EGYPTIAN GENERAL NEEDS WERE DISCUSSED. CONSIDERABLE
TIME WAS SPENT DISCUSSING AFRICA, THE HORN, AND ETHIOPIA
AND PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD FACE EGYPT IF WATER SOURCES IN
SUDAN WERE AFFECTED. ZAIRE SITUATION AND SOVIET ACTIVITY
THROUGHOUT AFRICA WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY'S
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 080771

VIEW WAS THAT U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO THINK ABOUT FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT FOR EGYPT, BUT C-130'S MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. IN
ANY CASE, MAIN SUBJECT WAS MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION, AND ARMS
WERE QUITE SECONDARY.

20. HORN OF AFRICA.

21. BAR-ON OBSERVED ISRAEL HAD LONG-STANDING INVOLVEMENT
WITH ETHIOPIA. DESPITE CHARACTER OF PRESENT ETHIOPIAN
GOVERNMENT ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THREAT IN ERITREA
WHICH ARABS HAD SUPPORTED SINCE 1955 PLUS AMBITIONS OF
SOMALIA WERE THE TWO BASIC DESTABILIZING FACTORS. IF
ARABS COULD REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING THESE MOVEMENTS,
THERE MIGHT BE MAKINGS OF DEAL, THAT IS, ETHIOPIA MIGHT
BE READY TO KEEP SOVIETS OUT. IN 1960 SOVIETS OFFERED
SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS TO ETHIOPIA, WHICH ETHIOPIA REJECTED
OUT OF THESE SAME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS. EGYPT, SUDAN
AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD DIM SOVIET PROSPECTS BY REFRAINING
FROM SUPPORT FOR THESE THREATS TO ETHIOPIA. DINITZ
NOTED ARAB DRIVE TOWARD DOMINATION OF RED SEA ENCOURAGED
IRREDENTISM AGAINST ETHIOPIA AND AFFECTED ISRAEL'S
INTERESTS IN FREE PASSAGE THROUGH BABEL-MANDEB. THE
SECRETARY MENTIONED SOMALIA HAD APPROACHED U.S. RECENTLY
FOR ECONOMIC AID, HAVING APPARENTLY FOUND HEAVY HAND OF
SOVIETS DIFFICULT AND WAS TALKING WITH ARAB COUNTRIES
ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE. U.S. JUST COMPLETED STUDY
ON HORN WHICH WOULD GO TO NSC NEXT WEEK. DINITZ COMMENTED
HE WAS INTRIGUED THAT SADAT WAS UPSET OVER SOVIETS IN
AFRICA. SADAT EVIDENTLY CONSIDERED SUDAN AS SECURITY
ZONE FOR EGYPT BUT COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF PLO-DOMINATED
WEST BANK UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE AS SECURITY PROBLEM FOR
ISRAEL.

22. PRISONER IN USSR.

23. DINITZ AT CLOSING REQUESTED THE SECRETARY TO DELIVER
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 080771

TO MRS. CARTER APPEAL FROM ISRAELI WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND
HAD BEEN SEVEN YEARS IN SIBERIAN PRISON. THE SECRETARY
AGREED TO DELIVER LETTER.
VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DEBRIEFINGS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 11-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE080771
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/IAI:WBSMITHII:SKG:LLC:DEF:SEB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P850106-1622, N770002-0562
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197704103/baaaevre.tel
Line Count: 332
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4a253e9c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2668562
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S MOSCOW VISIT; SADAT-U.S. VISIT: BRIEFING OF ISRAELIS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, EG, XF, SY, IS, LE, UR, XJ, PLO, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4a253e9c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009